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This study examined the influence of younger siblings on children’s
understanding of second-order false belief. In a representative
community sample of firstborn children (N = 229) with a mean
age of 7 years (SD = 4.58), false belief was assessed during a home
visit using an adaptation of a well-established second-order false
belief narrative enacted with Playmobil figures. Children’s
responses were coded to establish performance on second-order
false belief questions. When controlling for verbal IQ and age, the
existence of a younger sibling predicted a twofold advantage in
children’s second-order false belief performance, yet this was the
case only for firstborns who experienced the arrival of a sibling
after their second birthday. These findings provide a foundation
for future research on family influences on social cognition.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Individual differences in children’s development of theory of mind (ToM), defined as the
‘‘understanding of mental states, what we know or believe about thoughts, desires, emotions, and
other psychological entities both in ourselves and in others” (Miller, 2009, p. 749), have traditionally
252 A.L. Paine et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 166 (2018) 251–265been explored using the false belief task (Perner & Wimmer, 1983). Researchers have noted various
sources of individual differences on this task, including number of siblings (Lewis, Freeman,
Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 1996; McAlister & Peterson, 2007; Perner, Ruffman, &
Leekam, 1994; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998), family sociodemographic status
(Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Cutting & Dunn, 1999), and maternal education level (Pears & Moses, 2003).
Passing false belief tasks has also been found to be related to children’s language (Astington &
Jenkins, 1999) and executive function (Carlson & Moses, 2001).
Although it is well established that preschoolers with older siblings outperform those without sib-
lings on ToM tasks (Lewis et al., 1996; Ruffman et al., 1998), the influence of younger siblings on ToM
remains unclear. Piaget (1959) suggested that both younger and older siblings facilitate social under-
standing through discussion and reflection. Dunn (1994) claimed that siblings influence social under-
standing through talk about causality and internal states, management of conflict by parents, joint
play, shared jokes, and reasoning about moral issues; both younger and older siblings may equally
facilitate ToM (Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Perner et al., 1994; Peterson, 2000). Indeed, in a recent
meta-analysis by Devine and Hughes (2016), the number of child-aged siblings, regardless of birth
order, predicted false belief understanding during early childhood.
Despite these findings, the evidence is mixed. Some studies found no effect of younger siblings on
ToM tasks (Calero, Semelman, Salles, & Sigman, 2013; Farhadian et al., 2010; Ruffman et al., 1998;
Shahaeian, 2015), and in one case younger siblings had a negative effect on ToM (Wright &
Mahford, 2012). Younger siblings may influence ToM development negatively by placing increased
demands on parents’ time, resulting in a decrease in mother–firstborn positive interactions (Baydar,
Greek, & Brooks-Gunn, 1997), including play and conversation with the firstborn child (Dunn &
Kendrick, 1980a, 1980b). It is also possible that parents’ explanations to their firstborn children are
frequently interrupted due to younger siblings’ demands (Wright & Mahford, 2012). The age threshold
model proposes that younger siblings may need to reach a certain threshold in age before providing a
positive influence on ToM (Kennedy, Lagattuta, & Sayfan, 2015). If so, it is possible that some null find-
ings may be due to the younger siblings in those studies being too young to provide any advantage.
Younger siblings may become more important in fostering children’s more advanced understand-
ing of minds during middle childhood, but research on sibling influences on the later development of
ToM remains limited (Devine & Hughes, 2016; Hughes, 2016; Miller, 2009). Most studies examining
younger sibling influence on ToM focused on first-order false belief tasks (Miller, 2009). However, dur-
ing middle childhood, second-order false belief tasks are thought to be more age appropriate (Perner &
Wimmer, 1985). Whereas first-order false belief tasks typically assess children’s understanding that
someone may have beliefs that differ from their own, a second-order task assesses whether children
understand that one story character can have a mistaken belief about another character’s belief. Some
children pass this higher-order test of ToM between 6 and 7 years of age (Perner & Wimmer, 1985).
Findings about sibling influence on ToM in older children are mixed; in some cases both younger
and older siblings facilitated higher-order ToM performance (Kennedy et al., 2015; McAlister &
Peterson, 2007), but in other studies younger siblings had no effect (Calero et al., 2013; Miller,
2013). It is possible that older siblings begin to benefit from younger siblings as the latter become
more proficient playmates (Lagattuta et al., 2015). Alternatively, as firstborn children start school
and spend less time with family members, the initial sibling advantage may disappear.
Before a more definitive conclusion can be drawn, larger-scale studies are required to tease apart
the benefits of particular kinds of sibling constellations (Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown & Perkins, 2005).
Studies finding no effect of younger siblings may have lacked sufficient statistical power to detect
smaller effects once samples are separated into sibling constellation groups (i.e., sibling presence, birth
order, age spacing, and gender composition) (see Miller, 2013). ‘‘Only child” subsamples typically are
small (Miller, 2013). This not only leads to a decrease in power to detect an advantage in having a sib-
ling over none but also results in samples with a very high proportion of children who have siblings—
in some studies more than 90%, which exceeds the estimate that 80% of children in Western families
have a sibling (Volling, 2012).
Although previous research on ToM has highlighted covariates that need to be accounted for in
studies of sibling influence, rarely have these all been controlled in a single study, which may also
explain the mixed findings. These covariates include child age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001),
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Mitchell, 2000), language ability (Astington & Jenkins, 1999), and executive function, specifically
working memory and inhibition (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Harvey, 2014). Chil-
dren’s understanding of second-order false belief is positively associated with their language and
executive function (Astington, Pelletier, & Homer, 2002; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010;
Lagattuta et al., 2014; Perner, Kain, & Barchfield, 2002). However, in studies of sibling influences on
ToM, rarely are age, sociodemographic risk, language, and executive function all controlled (see
Kennedy et al., 2015; Miller, 2013); when examined together in one study, executive function was
positively associated with second-order false belief when age was controlled but not when language
ability was partialed out (Hasselhorn, Mahler, & Grube, 2005).
Although correlates of first-order false belief may also be relevant for second-order false belief, this
has not yet been fully established (Miller, 2012). Some of these correlates, such as executive function,
may be most important during early development of ToM; after children reach a certain threshold of
ToM skills during middle childhood, these relationships may attenuate or disappear (Lagattuta et al.,
2015).
To address these issues, we explored the ways in which younger siblings might influence 7-year-
olds’ performance on a second-order false belief task while controlling for known correlates of ToM in
a study of a nationally representative community sample of firstborn children and their families. Our
moderately sized dataset of firstborn children and their families provided a unique opportunity to
examine the effect of younger sibling constellation factors, including sibling presence, gender compo-
sition, and age spacing.Method
Design
The Cardiff Child Development Study (CCDS) is a prospective longitudinal study of a nationally rep-
resentative sample of mothers and their firstborn children. Data collection took place during preg-
nancy and at means of 6, 12, 21, 33 and 84 months postpartum. The current study focuses on the
home visit that took place at a mean age of 84 months. The CCDS is funded by the Medical Research
Council (MRC), and ethical approval was obtained for the procedures from the National Health Service
(NHS) Multi-Centre Research Ethics Committee and the Cardiff University School of Psychology
Research Ethics Committee.Participants
A total of 332 primiparous women and their partners were recruited between November 2005 and
June 2008 from NHS antenatal clinics in hospitals and general practitioner (GP) surgeries in two
Health Care Trusts in Wales, United Kingdom. The CCDS is nationally representative in terms of
sociodemographic factors; it did not significantly differ from families with firstborn children in the
large, nationally representative sample in the Millennium Cohort Study (see Hay et al., 2014).
A total of 321 families were seen after the birth of the first child, with 286 (89.01%) assessed at 7
years; of these, 272 (95%) were directly observed at home. The current sample comprises 229 of these
families (Fig. 1).
The participants’ mean age at the time of testing was 83.20 months (range = 67–104). The demo-
graphic characteristics of the children included in this subsample (69.0% of the original sample) are
summarized in Table 1. A child’s exposure to socioeconomic adversity was indexed by (a) the mother
not having achieved basic educational attainments (i.e., having no qualifications or fewer than five
general certificates of secondary education (GCSEs) or equivalent attainments), (b) the mother being
19 years of age or younger at the time of the child’s birth, (c) the mother not being legally married
during the pregnancy, (d) the mother not being in a stable couple relationship during the pregnancy,
and (e) the mother’s occupation being classified as working class according to the Standard
Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC2000; Elias, McKnight, & Kinshott, 1999). A principal
Fig. 1. Derivation of the sample.
Table 1
Demographic information for total sample and subsample.
Total sample Subsample
(N = 332) (N = 229)
Mother’s age at first birth (mean years) 28.1 28.8
Social class (% middle class) 50.9 57.6
Mother’s education (% > basic qualifications) 78.3 81.6
Stable partnerships (% stable partnerships) 90.4 91.3
Legally married (% married) 50.3 57.2
Ethnicity (% British or Irish) 93.0 92.3
Sociodemographic adversity index (mean) .00 .13
Firstborn child gender (% female) 43.3 45.0
Note. The N = 229 in the current study was not significantly different from the original N = 332 recruited.
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items contributed to a single component, which explained approximately 77% of the shared variance
in these risk indicators. Summary scores derived from this PCA measured the family’s exposure to
socioeconomic adversity (Perra, Phillips, Fyfield, Waters, & Hay, 2015).
In terms of sibling constellation, 172 children (75.1%) had at least one younger sibling living in the
home; of these, 133 (58.1%) had one sibling, 32 (14.0%) had two siblings, and 7 (3.1%) had three
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to the firstborn. In total, 91 children (52.9%) were in a same-gender sibling dyad and 81 children
(47.1%) were in an opposite-gender sibling dyad; of these, there were 47 (27.3%) older boy–younger
boy dyads, 44 (25.6%) older girl–younger girl dyads; 46 (26.7%) older boy–younger girl dyads, and
35 (20.3%) older girl–younger boy dyads.
The firstborn children entered siblinghood at a mean age of 35.7 months (SD = 16.8). To investigate
the influence of sibling birth interval, children were grouped according to the interval between the
firstborn and secondborn sibling births. Children who entered siblinghood at or below the first quar-
tile (24 months) were categorized as having an early arrival sibling (n = 45, 19.7%), children who
entered siblinghood at or above the third quartile (43 months) were categorized as having a later
arrival sibling (n = 44, 19.2%), and children with a sibling arriving between these quartiles were cate-
gorized as having an average arrival sibling (n = 83, 36.2%).
Procedure
Research assistants visited each family at home for two 2-h sessions. The caregiver (typically the
mother) was given questionnaires and interviewed by a trained research assistant to gather informa-
tion on the caregiver and firstborn’s well-being as well as family lifestyle arrangements and social net-
work. Where possible, these interviews would take place in a separate room from the child. During
these interviews, the child completed various cognitive, social, and emotional assessments in a quiet
space with a second trained research assistant. A third research assistant attended to keep any
younger siblings occupied while the assessments took place. A remuneration of £20 was given to
the caregiver, and a book voucher of £10 was given to the child, at the end of the session.
Measures
Second-order false belief task
This task was adapted from second-order belief paradigms (Coull, Leekam, & Bennett, 2006; Perner
& Wimmer, 1985). Each child was told a story enacted with plastic Playmobil figures by the experi-
menter. The protagonist was gender matched to the participant, and the sibling was gender matched
to the participant’s closest-in-age younger sibling. In cases where the focal child had no siblings, the
sibling character’s gender was randomly selected. The narrative is shown in Fig. 2.
Pathways to passing or not passing this task are shown in Fig. 3. Children were classified as min-
imally passing second-order false belief if they correctly answered the first location question with an
appropriate justification, and they were classified as passing second-order false belief with full com-
prehension if they also correctly answered the additional probe questions. An independent observer
coded transcripts for 32.9% of the participants and established excellent agreement for passing
second-order false belief (kappa coefficient = 1.00) and for appropriate or inappropriate justifications
(kappa coefficient = 1.00). There was also very good agreement within appropriate and inappropriate
justification codes, where the kappa coefficients were .89 and .79, respectively.
Verbal IQ
Each child’s vocabulary knowledge was assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS;
Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintillie, 1982). In this task, the experimenter spoke a word to the child, who
was asked to point or say the number of the picture that corresponded to the word. Each child’s verbal
IQ was calculated by age normalizing the data to produce a standardized score. The mean score for
verbal IQ was 99.54 (SD = 11.99), and the average age children in the sample were equivalent to
was 84.14 months (SD = 14.66) and ranged from 49 to 150 months.
Executive function
Cognitive function was assessed using tasks from the Amsterdam Neuropsychological Tasks (ANT)
(de Sonneville, 1999). The ANT is a well-validated and sensitive instrument to evaluate executive func-
tioning in population-based samples (Brunnekreef et al., 2007) and clinical samples (Rommelse et al.,
2008). The tasks were presented on a laptop computer, and children made responses using a mouse.
Fig. 2. False belief story with Playmobil. In this illustration of the story, the protagonist (Nick) shows his special teddy to the
child (A) and tucks the teddy inside the bed (B). The mother comes into the room and asks Nick to brush his teeth, and they
leave the room (C). In Nick’s absence, the sibling removes the teddy from the duvet (D) and hides the teddy in the cupboard (E).
Unbeknownst to Alex, Nick returns and watches Alex hiding the teddy (F) before leaving the room again (G). When Nick comes
back into the room, he says, ‘‘I want my teddy.” (H).
Fig. 3. Flow diagram displaying pathways to passing and not passing second-order false belief in the false belief story.
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dren were given a practice trial before starting the test trials.
The Response Organization Objects (ROO) task was used to measure response inhibition via chil-
dren’s reaction times to stimuli. Children were asked to hold the mouse with a forefinger of each hand
on each button of the mouse. In Part 1 (compatible condition), children were presented with a fixation
cross in the middle of the screen and were asked to respond to a red ball appearing on either side of
the cross by clicking the same side of the mouse on which the ball appeared. In Part 2 (incompatible
condition), children were presented with a white ball on the screen. Children were instructed to click
the opposite side of the mouse according to the position of the ball. Response inhibition was
operationalized as the difference between children’s mean reaction speed times in milliseconds
(M = 314.32 ms, SD = 195.65) between the incompatible (Part 2) and compatible (Part 1) tasks.
The Visuo-Spatial Sequencing (VSS) task was used to measure visuo-spatialworking memory. In this
task, children were presented with a gray square containing 9 circles symmetrically positioned in a
3  3 matrix on a computer screen. After a beep, a sequence of circles was pointed at by a computer
animated hand, and after the sequence children took control of the mouse to replicate the sequence of
circles. The test consisted of 24 trials and gradually increased in difficulty in the number of targets and
complexity of the sequence. Working memory was assessed using the total number of correct targets
in the correct order, with a total of 100 possible correct targets. The mean score for correct targets in
the correct order was 67.24 (SD = 17.94).Results
Children’s understanding of second-order false belief
Correlations, means, and standard deviations for all variables of interest are presented in Table 2. In
total, 95 children (42.8%) passed the minimal second-order false belief questions, and 67 children
(30.2%) passed the second-order false belief questions with full comprehension (Fig. 3). Minimal
second-order false belief and second-order false belief with full comprehension were positively
associated (Table 2). A Guttman scaling analysis using the Goodenough–Edwards method revealedTable 2
Intercorrelations among all variables of interest.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Presence of a sibling in
the home
–
2. Number of siblings
living in the home
.77** –
3. Timing of sibling arrival .a .33** –
4. Firstborn age at false
belief tasks
.10 .03 .22** –
5. Firstborn gender .03 .06 .03 .01 –
6. Second-order false
belief minimal
.09 .07 .03 .04 .10 –
7. Second-order false
belief full
.10* .10 .02 .06 .12 .76** –
8. Sociodemographic risk .09 .01 .15* .25** .11 .18** .18** –
9. Verbal IQ .01 .05 .12 .23** .07 .24** .23** .47** –
10. Response inhibition .15* .15* .13 .12 .15* .07 .04 .07 .01 –
11. Working memory .02 .02 .07 .21** .16* .09 .09 .24** .32** .17* –
Mean 0.75 0.95 35.68 83.20 0.45 0.43 0.30 0.13 99.54 314.32 67.24
SD 0.43 0.71 16.84 4.59 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.97 11.99 195.65 17.94
Note. Associations between dichotomous variables were tested by kappa coefficients.
* p < .05.
** p < .001.
a Correlation not computed because one variable is constant.
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full comprehension (CR = .99). Despite these two levels of passing second-order false belief being a part
of a single continuum, younger sibling constellation factors were only associated with passing second-
order false belief with full comprehension (Table 2). Therefore, the subsequent analyses focused on
children’s full comprehension of second-order false belief. Prior to investigating the influence of sib-
lings on this measure of false belief understanding, a preliminary investigation of its correlates was
conducted.
Correlates of second-order false belief understanding
Examination of the correlation matrix (Table 2) and the collinearity statistics revealed no issues
with collinearity among predictor variables: firstborn age, firstborn gender, sociodemographic risk,
verbal IQ, response inhibition ANT, and working memory ANT (variance inflation factor < 10, tolerance
> .20) (Menard, 1995; Myers, 1990). Verbal IQ and sociodemographic risk were significantly associated
with passing the second-order false belief questions with full comprehension, with higher verbal IQ
scores associated with better performance and higher sociodemographic risk scores associated with
lower performance.
No relationship was detected between the ANT measures of response inhibition and working mem-
ory and children’s passing second-order false belief with full comprehension, nor was a relationship
detected between age at the time of testing and second-order false belief (all ps > .19) (Table 2). How-
ever, in view of earlier research suggesting that individual differences exist in performance on false
belief tasks across different ages (Wellman et al., 2001), age was included in the subsequent logistic
regression.
In the logistic regression, these potential confounds accounted for 11% of the variance in second-
order false belief with full comprehension, v2(3) = 18.45, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .11. Children
who were older at the time of testing, Wald statistic = 4.21, p < .05, odds ratio (OR) = 1.08, 95% con-
fidence interval (CI) = 1.00–1.16, and those who had higher verbal IQ scores, Wald statistic = 7.17,
p < .01, OR = 1.04, 95% CI = 1.01–1.07, performed significantly better on second-order false belief;
therefore, age and verbal IQ were used as covariates in the subsequent analysis.
Do younger sibling constellation factors influence the firstborn’s second-order false belief performance?
There was no significant association between number of siblings living in the home and second-
order false belief performance (r = .10, p = .15) (Table 2). Therefore, all subsequent analyses explored
sibling constellation factors related to the closest-in-age sibling.
Presence of a sibling in the home
To test for variations in second-order false belief as a function of presence or absence of siblings in
the home, the sample was divided into two groups. Preliminary analyses showed no differences
between the groups in ratio of boys to girls, firstborn mean age, sociodemographic risk, verbal IQ,
and working memory (all ps > .15) (see Table 3). Children with siblings performed better on the
response inhibition task, t(76.83) = 2.03, p < .05. Children with a sibling had a twofold advantage in
passing the second-order false belief task with full comprehension, v2(1) = 5.00, p < .05, OR = 2.33,
95% CI = 1.10–4.97 (see Fig. 4).
In a subsequent logistic regression analysis (Table 4), the covariates were entered into the first step
of the model, which accounted for 9% of the variance in second-order false belief understanding,
v2(2) = 15.07, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .09. At the second step, the presence of a younger sibling
accounted for significant additional variance in understanding second-order false belief,
v2(1) = 4.97, p < .05, and the overall model remained significant, v2(3) = 19.98, p < .001,
Nagelkerke R2 = .12. Within this model, verbal IQ remained a significant predictor of second-order
false belief performance. Children with a younger sibling were twice as likely as children without
siblings to pass second-order false belief with full comprehension, Wald statistic = 4.53, p < .05,
OR = 2.35, 95% CI = 1.07–5.15.
Table 3
Means and standard deviations of all variables of interest for sibling groups.
Variable Sibling presence groups Sibling arrival groups
No younger
sibling present
Younger sibling
present
Early arrival
younger sibling
Average arrival
younger sibling
Later arrival
younger sibling
Average to later
arrival younger
sibling
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Firstborn age at false belief tasks (months) 82.44 3.91 83.45 4.78 82.67 5.29 83.05 3.79 85.02 5.57 83.74 4.57
Firstborn gender .42 .50 .46 .50 .42 .50 .48 .50 .45 .50 .47 .50
Second-order false belief .33 .47 .46 .50 .39 .49 .55 .50 .37 .49 .49 .50
Second-order false belief full comprehension .18 .39 .34 .48 .25 .44 .41 .50 .30 .46 .37 .49
Sociodemographic risk .03 .95 .19 .98 .19 1.07 .38 .82 .19 1.06 .18 .95
Verbal IQ 99.78 12.54 99.46 11.85 99.18 11.91 101.37 11.92 96.23 11.18 99.56 11.88
Response inhibition 366.29 230.11 297.40 180.60 317.48 175.05 267.18 148.92 334.49 229.62 290.34 182.69
Working memory 67.73 18.50 67.09 17.82 64.20 19.44 69.29 16.12 66.00 18.93 68.14 17.15
A
.L.Paine
et
al./Journal
of
Experim
ental
Child
Psychology
166
(2018)
251–
265
259
Fig. 4. Percentages of children who passed second-order false belief with full comprehension according to whether the firstborn
had a sibling present in the home.
Table 4
Logistic regression of presence of a younger sibling in the home, firstborn age, and verbal IQ as predictors of passing second-order
false belief with full comprehension.
Variable R2 B SE Wald v2 OR (Odds Ratio) 95% CI for OR
Step 1 .09***
Constant 10.91 3.61 9.12 0.00
Firstborn age .06 .04 2.86 1.06 0.99–1.14
Verbal IQ .05*** .01 12.68 1.05 1.02–1.08
Step 2 .12***
Constant 11.47 3.70 9.59 0.00
Firstborn age .06 .04 2.45 1.06 0.99–1.14
Verbal IQ .05*** .02 13.00 1.05 1.02–1.08
Presence of a younger sibling .85* .40 4.53 2.35 1.07–5.15
Note. The table presents the total R2 Nagelkerke statistic. N = 219.
* p < .05.
*** p < .001.
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Gender composition was examined in two ways; after same-gender and opposite-gender dyads
were compared, all four possible gender compositions—older girl–younger girl, older girl–younger
boy, older boy–younger boy, and older boy–younger girl—were explored. Preliminary analyses
showed no differences between the groups in ratio of boys to girls, firstborn mean age, sociodemo-
graphic risk, verbal IQ, and working memory or in inhibition across all of the groups (all ps > .10).
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belief (ps > .20).Birth interval
Although no association was detected between timing of sibling arrival and second-order false
belief understanding (r = .02, p = .81) (see Table 2), the four sibling arrival groups (no-sibling group
and early-, average-, and late-arriving sibling groups) were investigated. Preliminary analyses showed
no differences among these groups in ratio of boys to girls, verbal IQ, and working memory (ps > .15).
Significant differences were detected among groups in sibling age, F(3, 224) = 3.16, p < .05, sociode-
mographic risk, F(3, 225) = 4.13, p < .01, and ANT inhibition scores, F(3, 220) = 3.12, p < .05. Post
hoc tests were selected in accordance with results from tests for homogeneity of variances. Games–
Howell post hoc tests indicated that children in the late-arriving sibling group were older than those
in the no-sibling group and that children with an average-arriving sibling performed better on the
inhibition task than those without a sibling (ps < .05). A Tukey post hoc test indicated that children
with an average-arriving younger sibling had lower sociodemographic risk than those with a late-
arriving sibling (p < .01). A significant difference was detected among the four sibling groups in their
passing of the second-order false belief task with full comprehension, v2(3) = 8.97, p < .05 (Fig. 5).
This finding was explored further while controlling for covariates of second-order false belief.
Because late-arriving siblings did not significantly differ from the average-arriving sibling group in
performance on passing second-order false belief with full comprehension, these were collapsed into
one ‘‘average to late”-arriving sibling group. There were no significant differences among the groups in
ratio of boys to girls, firstborn mean age, sociodemographic risk, verbal IQ, and working memory or in
inhibition when these groups were collapsed (all ps > .06).0
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Fig. 5. Percentages of children who passed the second-order false belief task with full comprehension according to sibling
arrival groups.
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as the reference category in a logistic regression. Covariates (age and verbal IQ) were entered into the
first step of the logistic regression model. When entered into the model at the second step, early
arrival of a younger sibling and average to later arrival of a younger sibling accounted for a significant
step when entered into the model, accounting for an additional 4% of the variance in second-order
false belief with full comprehension, v2(2) = 6.57, p < .05. The overall model remained significant,
v2(2) = 21.57, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .13. The early arrival of younger siblings did not predict
firstborns’ passing of second-order false belief with full comprehension; however, ‘‘average to
late”-arriving siblings conveyed a significant advantage, Wald statistic = 5.63, p < .05, OR = 2.66,
95% CI = 1.19–5.96 (Table 5).
Discussion
When predictors of second-order false belief understanding were controlled, children with a
younger sibling living in the home were twice as likely to succeed on a second-order false belief task.
It was established that this sibling advantage occurred only for firstborns who did not experience the
early arrival of a sibling. Our finding stands in contrast to the first study of sibling effects on second-
order false belief tasks, which found no effect (Miller, 2013), but is consistent with previous research
showing that presence of a younger sibling in the home is advantageous for ToM (Lewis et al., 1996;
Perner et al., 1994; Peterson, 2000). In contrast to earlier work (Kennedy et al., 2015), the younger sib-
ling’s influence on a higher-order ToM task in our sample was not limited to same-sex siblings.
There are various mechanisms by which younger siblings could facilitate their siblings’ social
understanding; these might include engaging in joint pretense (Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), sharing
knowledge through teaching (Azmitia & Hesser, 1993; Zajonc & Markus, 1975), or engaging in conflict
and resolution (Dunn, 1994; Foote & Holmes-Lonergan, 2003). Our focus on younger siblings, how-
ever, revealed that the firstborn’s experience of the arrival of a younger sibling before the second
birthday did not provide a similar advantage. The first 2 years of life represent an important time
in ToM development, when evidence for consciousness, pretense, and the use of lexical terms for men-
tal states emerges (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Transition to sibling-
hood during this time may disrupt this process. Future work should examine multiple factors in family
interactions that explain differential effects of early- and late-arriving siblings on the oldest child’s
social cognitive development.
Children who experienced socioeconomic adversity performed less well on the second-order task;
however, this association did not remain significant when accounting for age and verbal IQ. This find-
ing stands in contrast to previous research (Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Cutting & Dunn, 1999), perhaps
because our study took into account a number of dimensions of sociodemographic risk beyond
occupational class or income. Although a number of sociodemographic risk factors have been foundTable 5
Logistic regression of dummy-coded sibling status groups, firstborn age, and verbal IQ as predictors of passing second-order false
belief with full comprehension.
Variable R2 B SE Wald v2 OR (Odds Ratio) 95% CI for OR
Step 1 .09***
Constant 10.91 3.61 9.12 0.00
Firstborn age .06 .04 2.86 1.06 0.99–1.14
Verbal IQ .05*** .01 12.68 1.05 1.02–1.08
Step 2 .13***
Constant 10.87 3.71 8.58 0.00
Firstborn age .05 .04 1.86 1.05 0.98–1.13
Verbal IQ .05 .02 12.87 1.05 1.02–1.08
Early arrival younger sibling .46 .51 0.82 1.59 0.58–4.34
Average to late arrival younger sibling .98* .41 5.63 2.66 1.19–5.96
Note. The table presents the total R2 Nagelkerke statistic. N = 219.
* p < .05.
*** p < .001.
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Ahlsten, 1996), and parental occupational class (Cutting & Dunn, 1999), rarely are these factors all
controlled in a single study (Pears & Moses, 2003).
Although the effects reported in this study were not large, it is important to note that the sample
size used in the current study provided sufficient power to enable detection of such small to moderate
effects. Thus, the absence of an association with children’s executive function abilities in this sample is
noteworthy given that there was sufficient power to detect such an effect. Although executive func-
tion abilities and first-order ToM have been found to be positively related (Carlson, Moses, &
Breton, 2002), a finding replicated in the current study with respect to working memory in particular,
there has not been consistent evidence for a correlation between executive function and second-order
ToM (for a review, see Miller, 2009). Indeed, executive function has been found to be positively asso-
ciated with second-order false belief when age was controlled, but not when language ability was con-
trolled (Hasselhorn et al., 2005). Alternatively, it is possible that the nonverbal measures used in this
study to assess executive function might not be comparable to other verbal measures of inhibition and
working memory such as Bear/Dragon, ‘‘Simon Says”–type inhibition tasks or word/digit span working
memory tasks (Carlson et al., 2002). Before a more definitive conclusion can be made, replication of
this finding using other executive function tasks is warranted.
In light of previous research suggesting that some 6-year-olds and the majority of 7-year-olds are
successful at attributing second-order beliefs (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), it is noteworthy that only a
minority of children in this community sample passed the second-order task. This finding must be
interpreted with some caution in view of the limitations of our study procedures. Data collection took
place in the family homes; therefore the assessment may have been influenced by distractions within
the home environment. However, evidence from this representative community sample may provide a
more accurate estimate of the number of children at this age who understand second-order false
belief. Finally, given our sampling strategy where we recruited firstborn children, we are unable to
determine whether our findings were driven by a general sibling effect, not just the influence of
younger siblings. Therefore, more work is needed to determine whether older siblings, as well as
younger siblings, continue to foster children’s understanding of minds into middle childhood.
In conclusion, the finding that the presence of a younger sibling in the home facilitated the first-
born’s false belief understanding draws attention to the unique contribution of the sibling relationship
to social cognitive development during middle childhood. Taken together with evidence from the vast
literature on first-order false belief understanding, our findings contribute to knowledge about the
influence of both younger and older siblings on a child’s development of a ToM during the middle
childhood years.
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